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OF PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT:
FIRREA'S CROSS-GUARANTEE REEXAMINED
A law ... that takes property from A. and gives it to B.: it is
against all reason and justice, for a people to intrust a legislature
with such powers; and therefore, it cannot be presumed that
they have done it.'
In recent years, the troubled economy of the United States has
had an extremely adverse effect on the banking industry. Two
years ago, problem banks in our nation numbered 1600,2 and
although the number of banks in immediate danger has declined,3
observers anticipate a continuation of bank failures into the mid-
1990's.4 According to the Bush administration, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) bank insurance fund, the fund
designated to bail the nation out of the savings and loan crisis, 5
will lose $6.1 billion by 1993 even if insurance premiums are
doubled.6 The possibility of a publicly financed bailout is a real
worry to a presidential administration that has repeatedly stated
its intention to avoid the passage of new tax laws.7 With the
1. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatim opinion of Chase, J.).
2. Michael L. Wilson, FDIC Should Not Rush to Give Banks a Rebate, AM. BANKER, Oct.
4, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
3. Id.
4. Michael Arndt, White House Sees Serious Bank Threat, CHI. TRm., Oct. 11, 1990, at
1.
5. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA),
Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), created the
bank insurance fund of the FDIC in August of 1989, see infra note 17.
6. Arndt, supra note 4, at 1.
7. The concern for the health of the FDIC's bank insurance fund, and especially for
the taxpayers who feel threatened by the prospect of an insolvent fund, is exemplified
by statements like the following, which were still being made more than a year after the
passage of FIRREA:
It is outrageous that taxpayers are being asked to pay billions of dollars to
clean up the S&L mess. It would be even worse if we did not try our best
to prevent a similar crisis at the FDIC ...
...To do less would be to ignore the lessons of history and to place at
risk the taxpayers and the long-term health of the American economy.
136 CONG. REC. S17,748-49 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). Con-
gressional members have attributed many of the banking industry's current problems to
"the Reagan administration's extremely poor oversight of the industry." Id. at S17,748.
Regardless of the cause of the bank failures of the late 1980's, members of Congress are
concerned about the possible effects on taxpayers. "The ultimate loser could be the
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failure of many more banks on the horizon, however, American
taxpayers are paying increasing attention to the crisis that has
gripped financial institutions, including both banks and savings
and loan institutions, across the country.8
In an attempt to recapitalize the deposit insurance funds and
to tackle the threat of proliferating savings and loan failures, the
Bush Administration played an instrumental role in the passage
of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA).9 FIRREA represented an "'all-important
first step in resolving the. . . savings and loan crisis.' ,,a Through
a number of its provisions, FIRREA restructured the system that
regulates the nation's banks. It authorized the expenditure of $164
billion to bail out ailing savings and loans" and created the Office
of Thrift Supervision (OTS) as "an office in the Department of the
Treasury"'12 to replace the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB).13 The powers of the Director of the OTS were carefully
American taxpayer and the economy generally." Id. at S17,749. Of course, as the Comp-
troller of the Currency has pointed out,
[when we discuss the FDIC's bank insurance fund,] we're not talking about
taxpayer money; we're talking about FDIC money which has been paid in
by banks in the form of insurance premiums. The taxpayer has never paid
a penny and I hope never will pay a penny for losses associated with a
commercial bank failure.
Failure of the Bank of New England: Hearing of the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (Fed. News Serv. Jan. 9, 1991) [hereinafter
Hearing] (testimony of Robert Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency), available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Fednew File. Only in the event of a failure of that fund will tax dollars
be needed to fund the bailouts. Naturally, commercial banks themselves will feel the
immediate impact of the crisis and can be expected to pass the cost of high insurance
premiums on to their depositors.
8. For example, the January 1991 failure of the Bank of New England and its subsid-
iaries, the Bank of New England N.W., Connecticut Bank and Trust, and the Maine
National Bank, has been called "the third largest failure in recent times . . . [and] one
of the largest in history." Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of Sen. Kerry). The Bank of
New England may prove also to be a watershed case in the history of the cross-guarantee
power, because it is the first case in which the FDIC has asserted that power. See infra
notes 79-89 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the cross-guarantee power
against the Maine National Bank).
9. President Bush signed FIRREA into law on August 9, 1989. See FIRREA, 103 Stat.
at 553.
10. National Council of Savings Institutions Praises FIRREA Legislation, PR NEWSWIRE,
Aug. 9, 1989 (quoting David J. Sullivan, Jr., Chairman of the National Council of Savings
Institutions), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews File.
11. US FDIC's Seidman Says Thrift Bailout to Cost More, REUTERS, Dec. 12, 1989, BC
Cycle, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Finrpt File. President Bush has since acknowl-
edged that the bailout may cost more than $164 billion. See id.
12. 12 U.S.C.S. S 1462(a) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
13. "Effective at the end of the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment
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enumerated and were somewhat broader than the powers of the
FHLBB.14 Congress created the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC)
to take responsibility for liquidating failed savings and loan insti-
tutions.'5 It also dissolved the FSLIC16 and replaced it with a new
division of the FDIC: the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
savings insurance fund.17
of this Act, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the position of Chairman of the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board are abolished:' FIRREA, S 401(a)(2), 103 Stat. at 354. In
addition,
[t]he Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Chairperson of the
Oversight Board of the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Chairperson of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Chairperson of the Federal
Housing Finance Board may use the services of employees and other per-
sonnel and the property of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, on a reimbursable basis,
to perform functions which have been transferred to such agencies for such
time as is reasonable to facilitate the orderly transfer of functions transferred
pursuant to any other provision of this Act or any amendment made by this
Act to any other provision of law.
Id. 401(e)(1), 103 Stat. at 356. The rest of 5 401 provides for the orderly transfer of
business from the FHLBB to the OTS and allows for certain exceptions, such as pending
suits and custodial accounts.
14. The powers of the Director of the OTS are based on those of the Chairman of the
FHLBB:
(e) Powers of the Director. The Director shall have all powers which -
(1) were vested in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (in the Board's
capacity as such) or the Chairman of such board on the day before the date
of the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and En-
forcement Act of 1989 [enacted Aug. 9, 19891; and
(2) were not-
(A) transferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Federal
Housing Finance Board, the Resolution Trust Corporation, or the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation pursuant to any amendment made by
such Act; or
(B) established under any provision of law repealed by such Act.
12 U.S.C.S. § 1462a (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). The Director's powers are broader, though,
because the Director has additional authority to prescribe regulations, see id. S 1462(b)(2),
additional autonomy, see id. S 1462(b)(3), and additional hiring powers, see id. S 1462(g)(1).
15. Id. S 1441a(b)(1).
16. "Effective on the date of the enactment of this Act, the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation established under section 402 of the National Housing Act is
abolished." Id § 1437.
17. FIRREA created the bank insurance fund of the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration:
(5) BANK INSURANCE FUND.
(A) ESTABLISHMENT. -There is established a fund to be known as the
Bank Insurance Fund.
(B) TRANSFER TO FUND. -On the date of the enactment of the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, the Permanent
Insurance Fund shall be dissolved and all assets and liabilities of the Per-
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The FDIC's savings insurance fund would have been destined
for the same grim fate as the FSLIC's fund' if Congress had not
provided another way to fund the bailouts of failed depository
institutions. Commentators commonly refer to this alternative
means of raising capital to help defray the FDIC's costs as the
FDIC's "cross-guarantee" power.19 This power enables the FDIC
to assess part of the cost of the bailout of a failed institution
against "sibling" depository institutions -institutions owned by
the same bank holding company that owns the failed institutions.
The FDIC has repeatedly threatened to use this power to help
defray its costs, especially in cases involving the failure of partic-
ularly large institutions. 20 With the failure of the Bank of New
England in January of 1991, the FDIC's threats became reality.21
Critics of the cross-guarantee power argue that its exercise con-
stitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without due process
of law.2
manent Insurance Fund shall be transferred to the Bank Insurance Fund.
(C) USES. -The Bank Insurance Fund shall be available to the [Federal
Deposit Insurance] Corporation for use with respect to the Bank Insurance
Fund members.
(D) DEPOSITS. -All amounts assessed against Bank Insurance Fund mem-
bers by the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation shall be deposited into
the Bank Insurance Fund.
Id. § 1821(a)(5). In the words of Senator Donald Riegle, chairman of the Senate Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, "something on the order of 30 billion [dollars]
ought to be the minimum that's kept in the fund." Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of
Sen. Riegle) (referring to the Bank Insurance Fund). William Seidman, Chairman of the
FDIC, has estimated that "70 billion [dollars] of assets [are] in institutions that [are]
expected to fail in [19]91," and, assuming his estimate is accurate, by the end of 1991 the
bank insurance fund will contain only about four billion dollars. Id. (testimony of William
Seidman, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation). Presumably, this
estimate does not account for any unforeseen expenses or unpredicted failures.
18. The FSLIC fund's sole sources of income were insurance premiums and special
assessments paid by insured banks. See 12 U.S.C. S 1727 (1988).
19. FIRREA authorizes the "cross-guarantee." 12 U.S.C.S. S 1815(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1991)).
20. See, e.g., Donna Tuttle, NBC Fallout Leaves FDIC With 'A Real Mess,' SAN ANTONIO
Bus. J., May 9, 1990, § 1, at 1 (discussing FDIC threats to use the cross-guarantee against
National Bancshares Corp.).
21. The FDIC seized the Bank of New England N.W. on January 6, 1991. The bank
had two affiliates, one of which was the Maine National Bank. The FDIC used its cross-
guarantee power for the first time since the passage of FIRREA, causing the Maine
National Bank to become insolvent and thereby bringing the entire Bank of New England
entity under FDIC control. The FDIC intended to simplify the bailout, but, as this Note
explains later, the FDIC may have violated the due process rights of the Maine National
Bank. See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text (analyzing the case of the Bank of
New England).
22. "No person shall be . . .deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
FIRREA'S CROSS-GUARANTEE
Whether the cross-guarantee power is constitutional is an im-
portant question to the banking industry and to legal scholars
alike. The power, although until recently not considered a central
component of the Act, is crucial to the success of the FIRREA
legislation. With the recent increase in failures of commercial
banks, FIRREA's success has become a priority. The Act was
implemented in the wake of a savings and loan crisis, but if
effective, it could play a substantial role in combating what many
see as an impending commercial banking crisis. Without the cross-
guarantee, FIRREA would be meaningful but powerless; it would
lack the economic weapons necessary to realize its potential. If
the cross-guarantee power is constitutional, then FIRREA could
be a solution to the FDIC's regulatory problems.23 It would be
able to provide the FDIC with funds in addition to the insurance
premiums already assessed against banks, which have proven
inadequate, and thereby avoid an otherwise inevitable loss to
taxpayers.
This Note discusses the fairness and constitutionality of the
cross-guarantee provision under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. The discussion focuses on the long-defunct
doctrine of economic substantive due process, whose laissez-faire
philosophy "has regained some of its former influence in the
political and academic spheres."' The Supreme Court has not used
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states in 1868
with the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, among other things,
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." Id. amend. XIV, 5 1. Because the FDIC is an agency created by the federal
government, this Note discusses the issue of whether the cross-guarantee provision is an
unconstitutional taking by the federal government, violative of the Fifth Amendment.
See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text (discussing the law of takings generally).
23. This Note does not depict FIRREA as a slightly flawed but otherwise perfect
answer to the banking crisis. Other provisions of FIRREA beyond the scope of this Note
may be ineffective because they increase the overall credit risk that savings and loan
institutions pose. See, e.g., Alex M. Azar H, Note, FIRREA: Controlling Savings and Loan
Association Credit Risk Through Capital Standards and Asset Restrictions, 100 YALE L.J.
149 (1990). Azar explained:
FIRREA's direct restrictions on the amount and type of assets that an S&L
may hold are based upon the false premise that the relevant measure of
risk is the riskiness of certain categories of assets. In fact, the proper
measure of risk is the riskiness of the entire asset portfolio, considered as
a whole. FIRREA's restrictions actually limit the opportunities for S&L's to
diversify their asset portfolios, thus potentially increasing rather than de-
creasing overall credit risk.
Id. at 150.
24. For the text of the Fifth Amendment, see supra note 22.
25. Michael J. Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis.
L. REv. 265, 266. For a discussion of the doctrine of economic due process, see infra
notes 109-41 and accompanying text.
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the doctrine to strike down a law since the early part of this
century,26 but an examination of the history of the doctrine is
crucial to an understanding of the disastrous potential of the cross-
guarantee power. For as the story of economic substantive due
process shows, the cross-guarantee provision is merely the newest
crack in the weathered facade of property rights, merely the latest
blow in a two hundred year long battle that has all but devastated
a once-sacred prerogativeY
This Note first examines the essence of the cross-guarantee
power: its history, its rationale, and its practical effect. The Note
then traces the development and death of the doctrine of economic
substantive due process, paying particular attention to its appli-
cation in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. The
Note also explains why the doctrine is currently in disfavor. Next,
the Note analyzes the cross-guarantee power in light of the doc-
trine, and examines the constitutionality of the provision under
current substantive due process jurisprudence. Finally, this Note
concludes that although the doctrine of economic substantive due
process is in disfavor and is unlikely to influence the rulings of
any federal court, application of its general principles could help
prevent unjust exercises of the cross-guarantee by protecting
against unwarranted intrusions upon property rights. Far from
recommending the revival of the doctrine of economic substantive
due process, this Note uses the doctrine to demonstrate the
inherent logical strengths and weaknesses of the cross-guarantee.
THE CROSS-GUARANTEE POWER
History and Purpose
The general category of financial institutions encompasses di-
verse entities. The primary members of the class are commercial
banks; investment banks; credit unions, which are governed by
26. The heyday of the economic substantive due process doctrine is often referred to
as the "Lochner era," after the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). For a
fuller discussion of Lochner, its progeny, and the Supreme Court's subsequent rejection
of Lochner, see infra, notes 129-57 and accompanying text.
27. Even since the demise of substantive due process, property rights have continued
to erode. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 28-32 (1991) (examining cases such as Hawaii Housing Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) and Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304
N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), and concluding that the courts routinely subordinate property
rights to other rights).
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their own separate legislation;28 and savings and loan institutions.
Each type of financial institution serves a separate function within
our economy and our society, but all are regulated on a dual
basis.
Traditionally, savings and loan institutions (also referred to as
"depository institutions" and "thrifts") performed two basic func-
tions: they provided a safe place for people to deposit their savings,
and they made loans to the public, using the funds from deposits,
for the purpose of building homes. Because of the limited nature
of these functions, savings and loan institutions largely took the
form of local businesses and remained wholly unregulated in the
28. Federal credit unions are governed by the Federal Credit Union Act, Pub. L. No.
73467, 48 Stat. 1216 (1934) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1795k (1988)). Under this Act, a
federal credit union is "a cooperative association organized . . . for the purpose of
promoting thrift among its members and creating a source of credit for provident or
productive purposes." 12 U.S.C. § 1752(1) (1988). The Act established the National Credit
Union Administration Board to manage the National Credit Union Administration, see id.
§ 1752a(a), which consists of three members appointed by the President "with the advice
and consent of the Senate," id. § 1752a(b). The organization of a credit union is a detailed
procedure that parallels the organization of any corporation:
Any seven or more natural persons who desire to form a Federal credit
union shall each subscribe either individually or collectively before some
officer competent to administer oaths an organization certificate in duplicate
which shall specifically state:
(1) the name of the association;
(2) the location of the proposed Federal credit union and the territory in
which it will operate;
(3) the names and addresses of the subscribers to the certificate and the
number of shares subscribed by each;
(4) the initial par value of the shares;
(5) the proposed field of membership, specified in detail;
(6) the term of the existence of the corporation, which may be perpetual;
and
(7) the fact that the certificate is made to enable such persons to avail
themselves of the advantages of this chapter.
Id. 1753. The certificate is then submitted to the Board for approval. In deciding
whether to approve, the Board takes into account "(1) whether the organization certificate
conforms to the provisions of this chapter; (2) the general character and fitness of the
subscribers thereto; and (3) the economic advisability of establishing the proposed Federal
credit union." Id. § 1754.
29. When banks decide to incorporate, they have two options: they can apply for a
charter either through a state regulatory agency or through the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency. State chartered banks that decide to become members of the Federal
Reserve System are governed on two levels: first by their state regulatory agency and
then by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Elizabeth Tibbals, Note,
ATM Networks Under The McFadden Act: Independent Bankers Association of New York
v. Marine Midland Bank, NA., 35 AM. U. L. REV. 271, 274 & n.21 (1985). For more
information on the dual nature of the banking regulatory scheme in the United States,
see Carter H. Golembe, Our Remarkable Banking System, 53 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1092-93
(1967); Howard H. Hackley, Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. 565, 566-67
(1966).
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United States for the better part of two centuries.30 They did not
compete with commercial banks because of their limited function
and appeal; they focused their attention on receiving savings
deposits and on extending long-term loansY' The speculation of
the Roaring Twenties made thrifts extremely popular with depos-
itors and borrowers alike, and until 1929, the savings and loan
industry expanded.32
Between 1930 and 1935 almost a thousand thrifts failed.3 After
acting to stabilize the banking industry, Congress turned its at-
tention to savings and loans. The resulting Federal Home Loan
Bank Acts established the Federal Home Loan Bank System,6
which was overseen by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board.- The
system created by the Act to govern the savings and loan industry
was based upon and analogous to the system already in place to
regulate the commercial bank industry.3 The Federal Home Loan
Bank Act established a dual (state and federal) regulatory scheme
and created the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), analogous to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
as the insurance administrator for insured savings and loan insti-
tutions.39
With the advent of the Reagan era and the general trend toward
deregulation, Congress passed legislation that largely deregulated
the savings and loan industry.40 The legislation removed the upper
30. MICHAEL WALDMAN, WHO ROBBED AMERICA? 14-18 (1990).
31. Id. at 15.
32. Id. at 16.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 17.
35. Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725 (1932) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. S 1421-1449 (1988)).
36. See id.
37. FIRREA abolished both the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation and redistributed the funds and functions of
these two organizations within the federal bank regulatory scheme. See supra notes 12-
17 and accompanying text.
38. Professor Garten notes that traditional regulation of the commercial banking
industry often took place from the perspective of a typical debtholder, who was unlikely
to take large risks with investments, "preferring a steady rate of return to aggressive
profit-seeking." Helen A. Garten, Regulatory Growing Pains: A Perspective on Bank
Regulation in a Deregulatory Age, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 501, 505 (1989). This characterization
of commercial banking regulation is equally apt in the field of savings and loan regulation.
Indeed, as some have said of the banking industry, "'the return of your money is more
important than the return on your money."' 186 CONG. REC. H7496 (daily ed. Sept. 12,
1990) (statement of Rep. Kleczka, quoting financier Bernard Baruch).
39. Ch. 522, 47 Stat. 725.
40. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96
Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), was a significant accomplishment
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limits on the interest rates previously allowed by Congress41 and
permitted savings and loan institutions to diversify their activities,
including allowing them to offer a modified checking account and
higher-yield depository accounts. 42 In the late 1980's, adverse ec-
onomic conditions in areas such as oil production, agriculture, and
loans to developing countries affected many customers' abilities
to make loan payments. 3 Furthermore, the New England real
estate market, which had experienced rapid growth in the early
and mid- 1980's, collapsed in 1989, leaving behind a glut of unoc-
cupied office buildings and condominiums.44 Savings and loan in-
stitutions that had lost their depositors to competition from money-
market accounts and commercial banking portfolios found them-
selves struggling, and the resultant savings and loan failures
depleted the FSLIC's funds:
According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), as of mid-
1985, 461 of the 3180 savings and loan institutions insured by
of the Reagan administration. Its stated purpose was "[tlo revitalize the housing industry
by strengthening the financial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring
the availability of home mortgage loans." Id., 96 Stat. at 1469. The Act increased the
power of federally insured thrift institutions to invest in government securities, loans
secured by nonresidential real estate, consumer loans, personal property, and educational
loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1988). Congress has often debated whether deregulation helps
or hurts the banking industry. Senator Lautenberg, for example, has argued that many
of the problems of the industry are due to the Reagan administration's inept oversight
of financial institutions, but he nevertheless believes that encouraging a free market
approach to banking is the only way to stabilize the financial condition of the nation's
banks. See 136 CONG. REC. S17,748-49 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
41. See 12 U.S.C. § 3503 (1988) (phasing out limitations on interest rates).
42. See supra note 40; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Regulation: The Future of
the Dual Banking System, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 4 (1987):
Banks and thrift institutions alike suffered a massive hemorrhage of disin-
termediation, as their customers became unwilling to bear the opportunity
costs of holding their funds in low-yielding checking or savings accounts.
The regulatory system adjusted by permitting banks to offer market-rate
certificates of deposit, interest bearing transaction (NOW) accounts, and
insured money market accounts. Today, the price cartel has been almost
completely dismantled, aside from a few vestigial rules such as the prohibition
on interest-bearing commercial checking accounts.
43. Miller, supra note 42, at 10-11.
44. Roderick Oram, New England Bank to Lift Loss Reserves by 1 Billion Pounds, FIN.
TIsES, Dec. 16, 1989, at 10; see also Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of Robert Clarke,
Comptroller of the Currency) (observing that most of the failed Bank of New England's
financial woes were due to its unnaturally heavy investment in the New England real
estate market, which proved unstable); Therese Poletti, OTC Column-Northeastern Bank
Stocks, REUTERS, Dec. 15, 1989 ("[Mlost of New England's economic problems stem from
overbuilding by real estate developers. Loans to developers and construction companies
are the biggest problem in many banks' loan portfolios .... But the problems are also
heightened by the slowdown among technology companies, many of which populate the
Route 128 area outside Boston."), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Finrpt File.
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the federal government had liabilities in excess of assets. Paying
off depositors in these insolvent institutions, according to the
GAO, would cost about 17 billion dollars, an amount far in
excess of the FSLIC insurance fund reserves of 6.06 billion
dollars. 45
Something clearly needed to be done, but Congress failed to take
positive action until the end of the Reagan administration. The
situation called for sweeping reform legislation, before it was too
late to avoid repairing the damage with massive tax increases.
The result was FIRREA.4 6
FIRREA was a remedial measure necessitated by a general
trend toward failure in the banking system.47 Several parts of the
statute set forth its purpose. The preamble calls it an Act "to
reform, recapitalize, and consolidate the Federal deposit insurance
system, to enhance the regulatory and enforcement powers of
Federal financial institutions regulatory agencies, and for other
purposes.."48 The cross-guarantee power is part of the attempt to
recapitalize the bank regulatory system. The deposit insurance
system cannot work without the funds necessary to pay the claims
of the depositors of failed financial institutions.49 Congress inserted
the cross-guarantee provision in an attempt to provide an alternate
means of procuring the funds needed to pay depositors' claims.
FIRREA does not limit its statement of purpose to the preamble.
The text of the statute declares that its goals are "[t]o provide
funds from public and private sources to deal expeditiously with
45. Miller, supra note 42, at 8.
46. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Professor Garten observed in 1989 that
"[elveryone talks about bank failure, but, like complaints about the weather, very little
seems to be done about it." Helen A. Garten, What Price Bank Failure?, 50 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1159, 1159 (1989). FIRREA represented an attempt to "do something about it."
47. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text (discussing the savings and loan crisis
in general and the fact that it necessitated the passage of reform legislation).
48. FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, 183 (1989) (preamble).
49. Previously, the institution's total deposits determined the insurance premiums it
paid to the Bank Insurance Fund:
[A] bank's assessment base for any date shall be equal to the bank's liability
for deposits (including the deposits of any other depository institution for
which it has assumed liability) as reported in its report of condition for such
date, plus the assessment base additions set forth in paragraph (5), and less
the assessment base deductions set forth in paragraph (6).
12 U.S.C. 5 1817(b)(4(A) (1988). This system of calculating insurance premiums contrasts
with risk-based insurance premiums, which take into account not only the amount of
deposits in a given institution, but also the risk that the institution poses to the insuring
entity. See infra notes 211-12 and accompanying text (discussing risk-based insurance
premiums as an alternative fund-raising method).
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failed depository institutions," "[to strengthen the enforcement
powers of Federal regulators of depository institutions," and "[tlo
strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding
or otherwise damaging depository institutions and their deposi-
tors."5 The first of these goals is perhaps the most indicative of
the purpose of the cross-guarantee provision. "Providing funds"
from "public and private sources" is an essential element of
FIRREA. One public source, namely tax dollars, was the only
alternative resource of the FSLIC before Congress implemented
FIRREA.51 As became painfully apparent to legislators and bank-
ers alike, this source was insufficient to counteract the inadequacy
of the insurance premiums paid by insured institutions.52 In en-
acting FIRREA, Congress provided the FDIC with an alternative
insurance policy: the possibility of obtaining funding from private
sources other than bank insurance premiums. The cross-guarantee
power allows the FDIC to tap the resources available within a
corporate "family" of banks in order to fund the rescue of one of
the subsidiaries. Although this seems on its face to be a reasonable
solution, its obvious consequence is that the "sibling" institutions
may also be forced into insolvency.5 This result runs counter to
critics' urgings that "[in this time of restructuring of the deposit
insurance system, there is a real need to consider the interrelated
problems of bank failure, regulatory disposition of failed banks,
and the impact of that disposition on healthy banks and their
investors."-
The purposes of the cross-guarantee clause go deeper. Before
the passage of FIRREA, the Federal Reserve Board consistently
required bank holding companies to serve as a source of "financial
and managerial strength" to their subsidiary banks. 55 This policy
50. FIRREA, § 101(8Y(10), 103 Stat. at 187.
51. A public source like tax dollars is distinguishable from the private source that had
always been available to the FSLIC: insurance premiums paid by member institutions.
See supra note 18.
52. See Miller, supra note 42, at 8-10; see also supra notes 6, 17 and accompanying text
(discussing the impending failure of the bank insurance fund).
53. See infra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing the Bank of New England
N.W. failure and the assessment of Maine National Bank in order to cause Maine National
Bank to fail as well).
54. Garten, supra note 46, at 1161.
55. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(1) (1991). This section specifically provides that "[a] bank holding
company shall serve as a source of financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary
banks and shall not contuct [sic] its operations in an unsafe or unsound manner." Id.; see
also Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement on the Responsi-
bility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources of Strength to their Subsidiary Banks,
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was known as the "source-of-strength" doctrine. The doctrine held
bank holding companies responsible for operating sound subsid-
iaries, and the Federal Reserve Board included in this responsi-
bility an obligation to transfer funds to subsidiaries that were in
financial trouble.5
The doctrine became a formal policy in 1983 when the Federal
Reserve Board made it part of its regulations.57 As the FDIC has
accurately observed regarding the use and enforcement of the
doctrine,
[d]uring periods when the economy was favorable and few banks
were in severe financial difficulty, there was no reason to
seriously question the implications of this doctrine. Moreover,
there was no opportunity to test whether the Fed had the
authority to force a holding company to use its resources to
offset losses in a bank subsidiary when such transfers would
have a significant adverse impact on the value of the holding
company.w
The first opportunity to test the doctrine arose in early 1987, 59
when the Federal Reserve Board (the Fed) ordered a multibank
holding company to provide $1.2 million in capital for one of its
failing bank subsidiaries. 60 Hawkeye Bancorporation was operating
thirty-two subsidiary banks in Iowa and was financially strained
at both the parent and subsidiary levels.6 1 When Hawkeye refused
to comply with the order, the Fed charged the holding company
with unsafe and unsound practices.62 The Fed later withdrew the
complaint after Hawkeye argued that agreements with creditors
of the holding company precluded such a large capital injection.6
4 Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) I 43,055A, at 22,058-59 (Apr. 24, 1987) (setting forth policy);
FDIC, Mandate for Change: Restructuring the Banking Industry, [1987-1988 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,103, at 93,026 (Oct. 1987) (discussing problems
with "source-of-strength" doctrine).
56. The power of the Federal Reserve Board, under 12 U.S.C. 5 1844(e) (1988), to require
bank holding companies to terminate nonbanking activities or divest nonbank subsidiaries
if they "constitute[ ] a serious risk to the financial safety, soundness, or stability" of a
subsidiary bank, is beyond the scope of this Note. The question the Note addresses is
whether the Federal Reserve Board should have the right to hold a company responsible
for unsound bank subsidiaries.
57. FDIC, supra note 55, at 93,026.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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Subsequently, however, the Federal Reserve Board released a
draft policy statement "reaffirming that holding companies should
act as a source of strength, particularly in situations where the
subsidiary bank is in danger of failing."64
In May of 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit struck down the source-of-strength doctrine in MCorp
FinaniW, Inc. v. Board of Governors.0 The Board had ordered
MCorp, a bank holding company based in Texas, to "'implement[ ]
an acceptable capital plan that would ensure that all of MCorp's
available assets are used to recapitalize the Subsidiary Banks that
are suffering capital deficiencies.' MCorp's subsidiary banks were
suffering heavy losses from real estate and energy loans."' '
The court held that the Federal Reserve Board, in attempting
to enforce its source-of-strength doctrine against MCorp as a
holding company, had exceeded its statutory authority.F The dis-
trict court had issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting the
Board from taking further administrative action and from forcing
a reorganization of the MCorp group except through bankruptcy
proceedings in which restructuring would be overseen by the
court.68
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System appealed
this order, asserting that the Board was authorized
to issue the source of strength charges under [the Bank Holding
Company Act, 12 U.S.C.] § 1818(bXl) and (3), which empower it
to file charges against a bank holding company which the Board
believes (1) has violated or is about to violate a "law, rule or
regulation"; or (2) is engaging in an "unsafe or unsound" prac-
ticeP
The Board of Governors argued that MCorp had violated the
Board's regulations and policy statements by refusing to act as a
64. Id.
65. 900 F2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990). cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1101 (1991). This ease was
pending before the passage of FIRREA, and despite the date of the decision, legislators
were aware, when they enacted FIRREA in August 1989, of the courts' hostility to the
source-of-strength doctrine and of the likelihood that courts would find it unenforceable.
66. Id. at 853.
67. Id. at 864. Notably, the court did not hold the source-of-strength doctrine uncon-
stitutional; it found merely that its enforcement in this case exceeded the Board of
Governors' statutory authority.
68. Id. at 854. The order appears in In re MCorp, 101 B.R. 483, 490-92 (S.D. Tex. 1989),
rev'd sub nom. MCorp Fin., Inc. v. Board of Governors, 900 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted, 111 S. Ct. 1101 (1991).
69. MCorp, 900 F.2d at 859.
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source of strength for its bank subsidiaries, and that MCorp
therefore was engaging in unsafe and unsound practices.70
The court disagreed with the Board of Governors. Citing Board
of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp.71 and Board of Governors
v. Dimension Financial Corp.,72 the court concluded that "the
primary purposes of the [Bank Holding Company Act were], to
prevent the concentration of control of banking resources, and to
separate banking from nonbanking enterprises."73 The Board has
the authority to consider financial and managerial strength when
deciding whether to grant or deny applications of holding compa-
nies, but this authority is expressly limited by case law.74 The
Bank Holding Company Act "does not grant the Board authority
to consider the financial and managerial soundness of the subsid-
iary banks after it approves the application.""5
Understandably, this decision caused considerable concern to
the Federal Reserve Board with regard to the source of funding
for the savings and loan crisis.76 The court decided MCorp on the
basis of statutes in place before Congress passed FIRREA; the
insertion into FIRREA of the cross-guarantee power subsequently
overruled the decision. The case remains useful, however, in ana-
lyzing the essence of the cross-guarantee. The source-of-strength
doctrine served as the ideological predecessor of the cross-guar-
antee provision, and the MCorp case, though finally decided after
FIRREA's ratification, certainly played a significant role in the
inclusion of the provision. The passage of FIRREA with the cross-
guarantee in place insured that, in enforcing the cross-guarantee,
the FDIC and the Federal Reserve Board would not be acting
outside their statutory authorization, as the Fed was in the MCorp
case.
70. Id.
71. 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
72. 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
73. MCorp, 900 F.2d at 861. The preamble to the original Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956 supports this conclusion by stating that the purpose of the Act was "[tjo define
bank holding companies, control their future expansion, and require divestment of their
nonbanking interests." Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133. The
Act was thus restrictive in nature and wa intended to remedy the damage done by the
lack of regulation of banks' activities and to avert future damage to the industry.
74. Id.
75. Id. (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Michael Quint, Fed's Uncertain Power Over Banking Companies, N.Y.
TiEs, Aug. 3, 1990, at Dl. The FDIC has not supported the Federal Reserve Board's
source-of-strength policy. Id.
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Practical Effect
Something akin to the cross-guarantee power, therefore, has
been the policy of the Federal Reserve Board for many years.
The provision in FIRREA is a reaffirmation of the authority of
the Board and of the FDIC to enforce the power. The cross-
guarantee's practical effect, however, allows the FDIC a great
deal more power than the source-of-strength doctrine ever did.
The essence of the cross-guarantee is that a "sibling institution"
(that is, one that is controlled by the same holding company as
the failed institution) may be held liable for the bailout of the
failed institution.r The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 defines
a "bank holding company" as "any company which has control
over any bank or over any company that is or becomes a bank
holding company by virtue of this chapter."78
77. The language of FIRREA specifies that funds seized pursuant to the cross-guarantee
power are to be transferred directly to the FDIC; the FDIC does not force the sibling
institution to inject its failed sibling directly with capital. Rather, the "insured depository
institution shall pay the amount of any liability to the Corporatn... upon receipt of
written notice by the Corporation:' 12 U.S.C.S. S 1815(eX1XB) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)
(emphasis added). If the liability incurred under the provision extended to the sibling
institution itself, it would be necessary to determine whether the FDIC had the power
to "pierce the corporate veil" between the two sibling corporations. The law of piercing
the corporate veil is complex, but the general rule is that the law will recognize the
separateness of corporate entities in the absence of a showing that the corporation is a
"sham" or is set up for fraudulent purposes. With a few exceptions, corporateness and
the positive and negative attributes of that status will nearly always be recognized:
If any general rule can be laid down, in the present state of authority, it is
that a corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity as a general rule,
and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears; but, when the notion of
a legal entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect
fraud, or defend crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association
of persons.
HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES 346 (1983) (quoting United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co.,
142 F. 247, 255 (C.C.E.D. Wis. 1905)). The standard for judging whether affiliated corpo-
rations (those with parent-subsidiary or sibling relationships) will be regarded as separate
entities is the same as for other corporations:
Separate corporateness of subsidiary and other affiliated corporations will
be recognized, in the absence of illegitimate purposes, where
(a) their respective business transactions, accounts, and records are not
intermingled;
(b) the formalities of separate corporate procedures for each corporation are
observed;
(c) each corporation is adequately financed as a separate unit ... ; and
(d) the respective enterprises are held out to the public as separate enter-
prises.
Id. at 354-55. For a survey of corporate veil-piercing theory, see Michael J. Gaertner,
Note, Reverse Piercing the Corporate Veil: Should Corporation Owners Have it Both Ways?,
30 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 667, 677-81 (1989).
78. 12 U.S.C. S 1841(aXl) (1988). The Act further defines "control over a bank" as when
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:293
The case of the Bank of New England illustrates vividly the
practical effect of the exercise of the cross-guarantee 79 To date,
this case is the only one in which the FDIC has exercised its
cross-guarantee power. The Bank of New England was a corpo-
ration with three subsidiaries: the Bank of New England N.W.,
based in Massachusetts; Connecticut Bank and Trust; and the
Maine National BanksO The Bank of New England N.W. had
invested heavily in real estate loans, and in 1989 it began to suffer
losses because of the downturn in the New England real estate
market.81 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
supervised the bank closely, attempting to remedy the problems,
but the bank continued to suffer losses throughout 1990."2 These
losses severely depleted the equity capital of the bank, causing
the 0CC to declare the bank insolvent on January 6, 1991. The
FDIC became the receiver for the bank,8 and the bank's failure
caused the failure of its two affiliates shortly thereafter.'
Although one of Bank of New England N.W.'s affiliates, Con-
necticut Bank and Trust, failed because it was unable to recover
money it had loaned to its insolvent sibling institution, the other
a company
(A)... directly or indirectly or acting through one or more other persons
owns, controls, or has power to vote 25 per centum or more of any class of
voting securities of the bank or company;
(B) the company controls in any manner the election of a majority of the
directors or trustees of the bank or company; or
(C) the Board [of Governors] determines, after notice and opportunity for
hearing, that the company directly or indirectly exercises a controlling
influence over the management or policies of the bank or company.
Id. S 1841(a)(2).
79. As of this writing, none of the parties to the case has initiated litigation. If the
parties do decide to pursue a civil action, the case will be very important to watch
because it could be the authoritative test case in the-analysis of the effectiveness and
validity of the cross-guarantee.
80. Hearing, supra note 7 (statement of Robert Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency).
81. Id. Comptroller Clarke explained the particular impact of the economic downturn
on all three subsidiaries of the Bank of New England:
[T]his economic downturn adversely affected virtually all New England banks,
but it has been particularly damaging for the bank of New England, which
aggressively pursued real estate financing during this boom. By failing to
adhere to sound credit underwriting standards or to maintain a properly
diversified balance sheet, the bank exposed itself to disproportionate and
ultimately unsustainable losses when the real estate market collapsed.
Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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affiliate, Maine National Bank, was forced to close as a direct
result of the FDIC's demand for compensation under FIRREA's
cross-guarantee provision. As Comptroller Clarke explained to a
Congressional subcommittee three days later,
The closure of Maine was triggered by the cross guarantee
provision contained in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Section 206(e) of FIRREA
[codified at 12 U.S.C.S. § 1815(e) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)] pro-
vides that an insured depository institution can be held liable
for any loss which the FDIC anticipates incurring in connection
with the default of a commonly controlled insured depository
institution. The FDIC, after consulting with the OCC, demanded
immediate payment by Maine of an amount equal to the FDIC's
expected loss as receiver for the [Blank [of New England N.W.].
When Maine responded that it was unable to cover the payment,
the OCC declared it insolvent and placed it in receivership. This
is the first time that the cross guarantee provision of FIRREA
has been used to close a bank.F
The Chairman of the FDIC readily acknowledged that his agency
deliberately used the cross-guarantee provision to
fail the Maine National Bank which was otherwise in sound
financial condition. This was done in order to bring all the banks
under our control at one time, thereby allowing us to preserve
franchise value, to stabilize the entire system and to be able to
sell the entire Bank of New England holding company banks to
one purchaser.P
The public policy ramifications of this use of the cross-guarantee
are very serious indeed. To save money and to help offset the
cost of the rescue of the Bank of New England N.W. and Connec-
ticut Bank and Trust, the OCC and the FDIC forced an admittedly
solvent institution into insolvency on the basis of their statutory
authority under FIRREA. This action, although not financially
necessary to the FDIC, preserved the resale value of the banks,
further improving the FDIC's financial condition at the end of the
transaction. Surprisingly, this exercise of the cross-guarantee power
87. Id.
88. Id- (statement of William Seidman, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation).
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did not capture the attention of the presss and the Maine National
Bank has not yet pursued any administrative or judicial remedy.
At the time of the failure of National Bank of Washington,
which was "one of the most costly in the FDIC's history,"'' the
press frequently speculated that the FDIC might use its cross-
guarantee power. When the National Bank of Washington became
insolvent in August of 1990, the FDIC sold most of its assets to
Riggs National Bank but retained the loans that it could not sell 1
Washington Bancorporation, which controls the National Bank of
Washington, also owns two financially healthy subsidiaries, the
Washington Banks of Virginia and Maryland.P According to the
Washington Business Journal, the FDIC eyed these subsidiaries-
worth about $10 million together-for possible exercise of the
cross-guarantee.P The Washington Banks of Virginia and Mary-
land, like the Maine National Bank, would have collapsed into
insolvency if the FDIC had chosen to exercise the option.w The
FDIC could then have sold all three failed banks and pocketed
the proceeds to help defray its cost. The advisability of causing
three failures to save the FDIC money has been sharply debated
in the press.95
The FDIC, however, made no accusations that either the Na-
tional Bank of Washington or the Bank of New England had
89. What did capture attention was the FDIC's decision to insure all deposits, even if
they exceeded the statutory limit of $100,000. Id. (statement of Sen. Riegle). This was
justified by the "too big to fail doctrine" or "essentiality test" often applied by the FDIC,
which asks whether a bank has such a great number of uninsured deposits exceeding the
statutory limit that a public panic might ensue when the bank enters receivership. Id.
(statements of Sens. Riegle and Dodd). Controversy has arisen because in cases like that
of the Freedom National Bank in Harlem, for example, the FDIC chose not to insure any
deposits when the bank failed. Even the FDIC leadership has expressed dismay that
"there [is] greater protection for bigger banks' depositors than there [is] for smaller
banks' depositors." Id. (testimony of William Seidman, Chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation).
90. Terrence O'Hara, NBW's Outstate Banks Exposed in FDIC Action, 9 WASH. Bus. J.,
Sept. 3, 1990, § 1, at 4.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., Will 'Source of Strength' Become a Source of Shake-Up?, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR, Aug. 1990, at 26:
"It's an important issue because it relates to the question of structure and
powers," says Karen Shaw, executive vice president at the Institute for
Strategy Development, a Washington-based consulting firm. "In the [MCorp]
case, it was alleged that the holding company gutted the multibank system
so it could isolate its problems in a few institutions and throw those into
the lap of the FDIC." For their part, most bankers insist that it remains the
day-to-day responsibility of a bank holding company to maintain healthy
subsidiaries.
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intentionally weakened their subsidiaries. All the evidence indi-
cates that the failures were inadvertent and due to imprudent
investment decisions and downturns in the markets in which the
bank systems had invested.9
The practical effect of the exercise of the cross-guarantee is
therefore broad. The power allows the FDIC to seize assets from
banks and merge those assets with the FDIC's own funds. FIRREA
requires no showing that the exercise is financially necessary;
all that is necessary is a unilateral judgment on the part of the
bank regulators that it would be prudent or convenient to seize
these assets. A serious question therefore arises whether the cross-
guarantee constitutes a taking of private property for public use
or a deprivation of property under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.
ECONOMIC SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
The Fifth Amendment: Which Clause and Which Doctrine?
The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."' The language is simple, but it has a rich history
of interpretation that must be examined in detail to determine
whether a deprivation is permissible.
The second clause of the Fifth Amendment, quoted above, is
often referred to as the Takings Clause. A taking is distinct from
a deprivation in several ways. First, when the government "takes"
property, it takes it for public use and is required to pay just
compensationP An example of a taking is a condemnation action
in which the government pays a property owner the fair market
value of the property being taken. This clause is stricter than the
first clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Deprivations Clause,
because it can apply only to private property being taken for
public use. The Takings Clause requires no process; its only
requirement is that the former property owner be reimbursed
"justly" for the value of the property.1°°
96. See supra note 81 (quoting Comptroller Clarke on the cause of the insolvency of
Bank of New England).
97. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (describing the reasoning for the exercise
of the power thus far).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see supra note 22 (discussing the different functions of the
Takings Clauses under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
100. d.
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A deprivation, on the other hand, can apply to a much broader
range of interests than a taking. According to the Deprivations
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the government may deprive an
individual of life (for example, by imposing the death penalty),
liberty (by imprisoning a felon), or property (by imposing a fine
on a misdemeanant). The deprivation may take place if and only
if the individual in question has received due process of law. 10
The concept of due process breaks down even further into two
categories: procedural due process and substantive due process.
Procedural due process involves the right of the individual to
have some sort of procedure to determine whether the deprivation
is fair. "The core requirements of procedural due process are
notice and a fair hearing,"'1 but the amount of procedural process
that is "due" often depends on the interest to be protected.a The
requirement of procedural due process protects the individual from
arbitrary government action that might harm the individual's life,
liberty, or property interests.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, involves "claims
alleging that government action is substantively unfair or arbi-
trary."' 0' In other words, some individual interests are so funda-
mental that no amount of process will compensate the individual
for the loss;05 regulation in these areas will always be struck
down because the amount of process provided is irrelevant to the
analysis of the deprivation. Justice Scalia has explained the dif-
ference between procedural due process and substantive due pro-
cess:
101. Id.
102. Phillips, supra note 25, at 267.
103. For example, a criminal trial in which the penalty to be imposed is a fine is likely
to differ in many substantial respects from a criminal trial in which the penalty is death.
Likewise, differences in procedure will be evident if the accused faces imprisonment, as
opposed to a small fine.
104. Phillips, supra note 25, at 268.
105. These interests are most often privacy interests. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (striking down a criminal statute prohibiting the procurement of an abortion
except when necessary to save the mother's life); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (striking down a criminal statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married
couples). Economic rights are not protected by thq substantive due process doctrine, but,
as Justice Scalia points out, "[u]ntfl the mid-1930s, substantive due process rights were
extended not merely to what we would now term 'civil rights' - for example, the freedom
to teach one's child a foreign language if one wishes - but also to a broad range of
economic rights - for example, the right to work twelve hours a day if one wishes."
Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, in ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE
JUDICIARY 31, 33 (James A. Dorn & Henry G. Manne eds., 1987).
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Although one might suppose that a reference to "process" places
limitations only upon the manner in which a thing may be done,
and not upon the doing of it, since at least the late 1800's the
federal courts have in fact interpreted these clauses to prohibit
the substance of certain governmental action, no matter what
fair and legitimate procedures attend that substance. Thus, there
has come to develop a judicial vocabulary which refers (seem-
ingly redundantly) to "procedural due process" on the one hand,
and (seemingly paradoxically) to "substantive due process" on
the other hand.'06
The cross-guarantee power does not lend itself to analysis under
the Takings Clause. Although its exercise is technically a taking
of private property for public use, the private property being
taken consists of cash assets', for which the only just compensation
would also be cash. If the FDIC were required to compensate
insolvent banks for the money it took, the cross-guarantee would
operate more like a loan than a seizure. Although this idea is
appealing from a pure property-rights standpoint, it defeats the
purpose of the cross-guarantee, which is to provide funds to the
FDIC to aid it in its task of insuring deposits.
The cross-guarantee lends itself more easily to analysis under
the Deprivations Clause. Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
a comprehensive and lengthy appeal process is available to insol-
vent banks.1 Analysis of the procedural safeguards available to
insolvent banks would require an inquiry into the constitutional
soundness of the Administrative Procedure Act, which has been
in place since 1946 in substantially its original form.jo Although
procedural due process may be an interesting theory under which
to analyze the constitutionality of the cross-guarantee, such an
analysis would require an inquiry into the constitutionality of a
law that has not been seriously criticized in more than fifty years.
The doctrine of substantive due process, however, provides a
useful framework for analyzing the constitutionality of the cross-
guarantee provision. As has been pointed out, courts have not
applied substantive due process to economic rights since the
1930's.109 The Framers of the Constitution considered property
106. Scalia, supra note 105, at 33.
107. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. SS 550-706 (1988), provides for process
and hearings of disputes arising out of decisions made by government agencies.
108. Congress enacted the original provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act in
June of 1946. Ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237. The Act was revised and codified by Pub. L. No. 89-
554, SS 501-706, 80 Stat. 378, 380-93 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. SS 500-706 (1988)).
109. See supra note 105 (quoting Justice Scalia).
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rights extremely important, however, and proponents of the sub-
stantive due process theory point out that
[tihe question arises whether judicial protection of the property
right is similarly important and appropriate for contemporary
society, which does not seem to have the same dedication to
ownership that prior generations did.... [Tihe underlying basis
for securing property interests has not changed. A free society
cannot exist unless government is prohibited from confiscating
private property. If government can seize something owned by
a private citizen, it can exert enormous power over people. One
would be reluctant to speak, write, pray, or petition in a manner
displeasing to the authorities lest he lose what he has already
earned and possesses.10
In addition, the economic deregulation popularized during the
Reagan era and the recent apparent interest in the doctrine of
economic substantive due process"" will excuse a foray into the
workings of a long-defunct constitutional doctrine. Placing the
cross-guarantee power against the background of economic sub-
stantive due process will expose the logical strengths and weak-
nesses of the provision and will show the impact of this deprivation
on the banks that have been, and in the future will be, subject to
it.
The Birth and Heyday of the Doctrine
The actual origin of the doctrine of economic substantive due
process is hard to pinpoint, but historians agree that the Framers
of the Constitution regarded property and economic rights as
extremely important.112 The Framers may have had a heightened
consciousness of the importance of property rights because
110. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 83 (1980).
111. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 25, at 266 & n.7 (isting authors who have proposed
rehabilitation of the doctrine); see also Guy Miller Struve, The Less-Restrictive Alternative
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967) (arguing that rather
than abandoning the doctrine of economic due process altogether, the courts should strike
down economic regulation if the.legislatures have a less restrictive alternative).
112. Siegan is "persuaded that the Framers accepted, as part of the constitutional
government that they created, the common-law system and tradition to preserve and
protect the liberties of the people." SIEGAN, supra note 110, at 97. In addition, he points
out that according to the Framers, "the most fundamental of all rights were those which
protect individuals from death or incarceration at the will of the state, and an owner of
real or personal property from confiscation." Id. at 98. The Fifth Amendment protects
precisely these interests.
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people of the constitutional period had more reason to compre-
hend the great harm that results when monarchs, lords, and
officials deprive individuals of their lawfully acquired possessions
and interfere in the lawful pursuit of commerce. An individual's
right to own and use property free of governmental restraint
(except for taxation) meant emancipation, independence, and
autonomy 3
Whatever their reasons, early Supreme Court Justices accorded
property rights an almost sacred respect. Justice Chase's opinion
in Calder v. Bull,"4 for example, in defining representative gov-
ernment as a "social compact," pointed out that
[tlhere are acts which the Federal ... Legislature cannot do,
without exceeding their authority. There are certain vital prin-
ciples in our free Republican governments, which will determine
and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power;
as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or to take
away that security for personal liberty, or private property, for
the protection whereof the government was established."5
Chase went on to conclude that "[a] law that takes property from
A. and gives it to B.... is against all reason and justice.""6 Finally,
Chase stated that "[tihe Legislature ... cannot ... violate ... the
right of private property. To maintain that our Federal, or State
Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly
restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether
inadmissible in our free republican governments." 7 Commentators
have contended that the Ninth Amendment, which specifies that
"[the enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people,""8
is an illustration of the belief that certain natural rights exist above
and beyond those rights created by law, and that government cannot
intrude on those rights, even if specifically authorized to do so."9
This contention supports Chase's view of the regulation of economic
rights.'w
113. Id. at 98.
114. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
115. Id. at 388 (seriatim opinion of Chase, J.).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 388-89.
118. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
119. See Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic Due Process
Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1364 n.8 (1990) (citing Edward S. Corwin, The
"Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 1), 42 HARV. L. Rav. 149,
153 (1928)).
120. Siegan points out the interesting dichotomy that exists in the regulation of rights.
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As the nation entered the nineteenth century, the idea of regu-
lating economic interests was unpopular at best. In 1856, the Su-
preme Court, adhering to its policy of requiring economic due
process, handed down one of the most unpopular decisions of its
history: Dred Scott v. Sandford.12' Dred Scott was the infamous case
that attempted to legitimize slavery in the United States; thus it is
not surprising that the decision should go down in history as one
of the most despised decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
The Court has never expressly overruled Dred Scott,2 but has
questioned the decision repeatedly. At least since the landmark
racial equality case of Brown v. Board of Education,m Dred Scott
has fortunately been considered outdated, dead, and buried law.
Dred Scott is nevertheless a good example of the application of
the doctrine of economic rights in the mid-nineteenth century. The
case is well known for its facts and its holdings. Scott, a negro
slave, claimed that because he and his family had lived with their
owner in Missouri and Illinois before being sold to the defendant,
Scott was a citizen of the United States and therefore a free man.su
Justice Taney, writing for the Court, phrased the issue thus:
Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country,
and sold as slaves, become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of the
United States, and as such become entitled to all the rights,
and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by that instrument
to the citizen? 25
In the context of First Amendment rights, government supervision is referred to as
"censorship," whereas government supervision of economic rights is commonly referred
to as "regulation." The connotations of these two terms "becloud the similarities" between
the two distinct types of rights. SIEGAN, supra note 110, at 248.
121. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). Dred Scott is undoubtedly, and certainly understandably, at
least partially responsible for the unpopularity of economic due process jurisprudence
today.
122. The decision was, however, reversed by the ratification of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution, which abolished slavery, see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, 5 1; the
Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that "[all persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside," id. amend. XIV, 5 1; and the Fifteenth Amendment,
which sought to insure citizens' right to vote regardless of "race, color, or previous
condition of servitude," id. amend. XV, S 1.
123. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
124. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 397-98.
125. Id. at 403.
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Taney held that a slave was not a citizen, but property.12 To
free Scott would have been a violation of the Fifth Amendment
prohibition on the taking of property without due process of
law.12 As Taney stated,
the rights of property are united with the rights of person,
and placed on the same ground by the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United
States of his liberty or property, merely because he came
himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of
the United States, and who had committed no offence against
the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due
process of law.'2
The flaw in Taney's reasoning was his characterization of the
slaveholder as a property owner and a citizen, although Scott
was merely property and not a citizen. Only the slaveholder's
rights concerned Taney, and he did not question whether Scott
had been deprived of his liberty without due process of law.
Economic regulation notwithstanding, no one would argue today
that one person's property rights should take precedence over
another person's liberty interests. Such a holding is what made
Dred Scott perhaps the most unpopular case the Supreme Court
ever decided.
Despite the disastrous result in Dred Scott and the subsequent
civil war and abolition of slavery, economic rights like those
protected in Dred Scott continued to enjoy favor in the Supreme
Court. The doctrine of economic substantive due process reached
its zenith in the period between 1897 and 1937. During this time,
however, the Court applied the doctrine mainly to protect "free-
dom of contract" and individuals' freedom to work for a living
at occupations of their own choosing, and not to takings or
deprivations. A good example of twentieth-century application of
the doctrine is the well-known and frequently-cited 1905 case of
Lochner v. New York.12
Lochner dealt with a New York statute regulating the hours
and working conditions of persons employed in bakeries. The
statute limited the hours of such employees to no more than
126. Id at 451-52.
127. Id. at 450.
128. Id.
129. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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sixty hours per week, or ten hours per day.ss The defendant in
the case ran a bakery in Utica, New York and permitted his
employees to work in excess of the maximum statutorily pre-
scribed hours. He was convicted twice of violating the statute.131
He appealed his second conviction, claiming that the statute was
"not a reasonable exercise of the police power"'3 2 and that al-
though the statute was purportedly a health regulation, its effect
was to restrict bakers' rights to work the hours of their own
choosing.'ss
The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the conviction. In a
five-to-four decision,&4 it held that the statute interfered "with
the right of contract between the employer and employes, con-
cerning the number of hours in which the latter may labor in
the bakery of the employer."'15 Under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,s 6 the states could impose regulations that were clearly
within their police powers, like legitimate public health laws. But
"[t]here is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty
of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours
of labor, in the occupation of a baker.... We think the limit of
the police power has been reached and passed in this case."1
The effect of the law in Lochner was to regulate an individual's
freedom to sell or purchase labor, and the Court found this effect
violative of the Constitution.s 8
Lochner's focus was on the freedom of the individual to control
his own ability to enter into employment contracts, regardless
of whether he was "selling" or "buying" labor. Under Lochner,
any regulation that had the effect of impairing the freedom of
contract and did not have a legitimate connection to the state's
police power would be invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Arbitrary though it was, however, Locher's test was not an
empty formality. For even though the Court struck down much
regulation simply because it interfered with an individual's eco-
130. Id. at 46 n.1.
131. Id. at 46.
132. Id. at 49.
133. Id. at 51.
134. Justice Peckham wrote the majority opinion; Justices Harlan, White, and Day
dissented; and Justice Holmes filed a separate dissenting opinion.
135. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.
136. Lochner presented a Fourteenth Amendment issue because it involved a challenge
to a state statute; FIRREA's cross-guarantee presents Fifth Amendment issues because
FIRREA is a federal statute. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (explaining the
difference between the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
137. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-58.
138. Id. at 64.
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nomic life or with ownership of property, laws with legitimate
purposes sometimes withstood constitutional muster.1' The dis-
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate purposes was unac-
ceptably vague,140 but the Court's message was clear: property
rights possessed a strength and vitality grounded in the Consti-
tution, and legislatures could not abridge them without good
reason.
The doctrine of substantive due process, however, was rushing
headlong toward its own demise. As one commentator has pointed
out,
[the] concept was ultimately doomed in part because under it
some welfare legislation was declared unconstitutional. Prob-
ably no group of justices has ever been the object of so much
criticism as have been these early proponents of substantive
due process. Yet these justices sought to uphold economic
liberties as much as civil libertarians strive to uphold intellec-
tual and political rights, and ... with at least as much, if not
more, constitutional sanction.'
By the end of the 1930's, Lochner and the concept for which it
stood were completely dead, and Court has never revived the
doctrine of economic substantive due process.
139. See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding a
local zoning ordinance).
140. Compare Euclid with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). In
Euclid, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance in the face of claims that it deprived
landowners "of liberty and property without due process of law" in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384. Acknowledging lower court's recognition
that zoning laws bore "a rational relation to the health and safety of the community"
id. at 391, the Court refused to strike down the ordinance because the plaintiff had not
shown it to be "arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morals, or general welfare:' id. at 395.
In Mahon, however, the Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania law that prevented
coal companies from mining under land whenever mining might cause subsidence of land
supporting homes. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13. The parties agreed that the statute
"destroy[ed] previously existing rights of property and contract," but disagreed over
whether the state's police power could be extended to protect the "public interest" in
the safety of a private house. Id. at 413. The Court found this justification insufficient
because the statute took the mining companies' property without just compensation. Id.
at 415-16; see also SIEGAN, supra note 110, at 129-31. AlthougO Euclid permitted states
and localities to ensure that homes were exposed to "the free circulation of air" and "the
rays of the sun," Euclid, 272 U.S. at 394, Mahon denied them the power to keep those
same homes from sliding into the ground.
In 1980, Siegan pointed out that because Mahon did not involve contract rights, it
remained the law of the land. SIEGAN, supra, note 110, at 129. The continued validity of
Mahon is somewhat questionable following the Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), which purported to distinguish Mahon
but came to a contrary conclusion on remarkably similar facts.
141. BERNARD H. SIEGAN, THE SUPREME COURT'S CONSTITUTION 42 (1987).
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The Death of the Doctrine
The Great Depression led to the downfall of the doctrine of
economic substantive due process. For instance, when milk prices
began to decline drastically in the early 1930's, a New York State
regulatory board passed minimum price legislation for milk sell-
ers in an effort to insure that milk producers would still operate
at a profit.142 The legislation criminalized the act of selling milk
in a retail store for less than the statutorily prescribed price.143
One milk seller in Rochester violated the law and was convicted;
he appealed the conviction, claiming that the law infringed on
his right to freedom of contract. 44
In Nebbia v. New York, 45 the Supreme Court began to show
its uneasiness with the rule set out in Lochner. Justice Roberts,
in framing the issue, asked "whether the Federal Constitution
prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk."' 48
Uncomfortable with the prospect of overturning the conviction
in the face of the milk producers' economic hardship, he explained
the motivation for the legislation, remarking that "[t]he situation
of the families of dairy producers had become desperate and
called for state aid similar to that afforded the unemployed, if
conditions should not improve."' 47 Finally, in addressing the ap-
pellant's Fourteenth Amendment argument, Justice Roberts con-
ceded that the freedom of contract heretofore so zealously
protected was not absolute:
Under our form of government the use of property and the
making of contracts are normally matters of private and not
of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free
of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if
the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of
his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contfact to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of
the public to regulate it in the common interest.148
Nebbia appeared merely to restate the Court's previous obser-
vations that legitimate purposes could permit a legislature to
142. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 515 (1934).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 291 U.S. 502.
146. Id. at 515.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 523 (citations omitted).
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abridge property and contract rights. If one's exercise of property
or contract rights harmed another, or the public interest, the
government could regulate the exercise of those rights. The Court
reiterated the same formal test it had applied in previous cases:
"that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with
due process, that the regulation] shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be at-
tained."'14 9 Yet property rights were no longer of paramount
importance. By ranking the "common interest" and property
rights as "[eiqually fundamental" considerations, Nebbia served
as an "early warning signal of property's shifting rank among
constitutional values."'16
Although Nebbia did not kill Lochner, West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish'5' dealt the fatal blow. West Coast Hotel involved a
chambermaid who earned a wage agreed upon when the hotel
hired her. 52 The State of Washington, however, had fixed a
minimum wage for women that exceeded the chambermaid's
contractual wages.m She sought recovery of the statutory wages,
and the hotel responded that the minimum wage law was uncon-
stitutional because it violated the principles of freedom of con-
tract.15 The Court held that a "regulation which is reasonable in
relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the
community is due process."'1 The hotel, therefore, although being
deprived of property, had received due process simply because
the legislature had passed the law "in the interests of the
community."'u This broad stroke followed from the majority's
new definition of the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment:
The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract. It
speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty with-
out due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation the
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable
liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has its history and
149. Id. at 525. Compare this language with the Court's refusal in Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), to strike down a zoning ordinance because
the plaintiff had not shown it to be "arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."
150. GLENDON, supra note 27, at 27 (citing Nebbia).
151. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
152. Id. at 388.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 391.
156. Id.
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connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social
organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of
the people.167
In West Coast Hotel, the Court deferred to the legislature. A
legislature could make its own judgments, even if the wisdom of
its action was debatable and the effects of the legislation un-
clear.10 This dramatic change in the law was inevitable, for the
sweeping reforms of the New Deal could never have achieved
their desired effect if they had been struck down on substantive
due process grounds. Yet the West Coast Hotel ruling, however
sorely needed during the Depression years to enable the rise of
the welfare state, nevertheless allowed those whose needs were
adequately represented in the legislature to govern the property
and contract rights of those who were inadequately represented.
The mere fact that a legislature had passed a law meant that
the person whose rights the law affected had received all the
due process the Constitution required. West Coast Hoters deci-
mation of economic rights led directly to cases such as Williamson
v. Lee Optical Co., 159 decided eighteen years later, in which the
Court demonstrated that it "[would] not only presume that a
legislature had a reasonable basis for enacting a particular eco-
nomic measure, but also [would] hypothesize reasons for the law's
enactment if the legislature fail[ed] to state explicitly the reasons
behind its judgment."' 60
Economic Due Process Today
Undoubtedly, the current doctrine of economic due process as
exemplified in Lochner is "dead."'61 The economic jurisprudence
of the Lochner era is "now universally acknowledged to have
been constitutionally improper,' '162 and the Supreme Court has
not used economic substantive due process reasoning to strike
157. 1d. at 391.
158. Id. at 399.
159. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (upholding a statute prohibiting opticians from fitting or
duplicating eyeglasses without a prescription).
160. JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 446 (2d ed. 1983).
161. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Constitution of Business, 11 G o. MASON U. L. Rav.
53, 53 (1988).
162. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIw 14
(1980).
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down a law since 1937.1ee Although scholars have written a great
deal about the doctrine in the past twenty years, most of the
comments have been negative." Some conservative scholars have
recently come out in favor of reviving the doctrine,165 but no
amount of praise is likely to convince the Supreme Court to
overturn the Nebbia-West Coast Hotel line of cases and exhume
a jurisprudential standard that has been dead for over half a
century.
Despite this disfavor, however, "the Court has never explicitly
rejected the idea that the liberty guaranteed by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments includes some protection of economic
rights."16 The problem is that under the loose standard of West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,"67 economic rights, particularly the right
to freedom of contract, are fragile at best, and legislation affecting
them does not deserve any sort of heightened scrutiny to test
its validity.
Nevertheless, federal courts continue to protect quasi-economic
rights on a limited basis, despite the Supreme Court's express
disavowal of this sort of protection. The Court has applied sub-
stantive due process in the realm of privacy rights without
hesitation;,1 6 in fact, some decisions that strike down state action
on the basis of privacy rights could be construed as protection
of economic interests on privacy grounds. Two good examples of
this sort of decision making are the recent cases of Yeager v.
Hackensack Water Co. 6 9 and Andrews v. Ballard.70
In Yeager, the State of New Jersey had declared a drought
emergency, and pursuant to an executive order, the Hackensack
Water Company, which supplied water to sixty municipalities,
163. Note, supra note 119, at 1363; see West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
164. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: TH TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 265-68 (1977) (arguing that the use of substantive due process
to protect personal rights is no more justified than its use to protect economic rights);
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34 (arguing that the Court lacks both the expertise and the
power necessary to review economic legislation); Scalia, supra note 105, at 34-37 (agreeing
with the Court's current position on economic rights).
165. See, e.g., Note, supra note 119, at 1863 n.1 (calling criticism of the doctrine "hostility
and prejudice" and arguing for a revival of judicial protection of economic rights).
166. Id at 1363.
167. 300 U.S. 379; see supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text (describing the standard
set forth in the Court's opinion).
168. See supranote 105 and accompanying text (describing the two uses of substantive
due process: economic and privacy oriented).
169. 615 F. Supp. 1087 (D.NJ. 1985).
170. 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
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began rationing water to its customers.171 The water company
allowed residents to use fifty gallons of water per person per
day;172 in order to assure compliance, the water company asked
residents to list the names and social security numbers of all the
persons living in each household.173 Failure to reply subjected
the resident in question to civil and criminal sanctions. 74
The plaintiffs challenged the action on privacy grounds.17 5 The
district court held that although Hackensack's use of social se-
curity numbers was "not per se impermissible,"' 76 the water
company had failed to comply with the disclosure requirements
of the Privacy Act of 1974.'77 The court also found unconstitu-
tional the compelled disclosure of the names of persons living
within each household, because "the right to be free from com-
pelled disclosure of the names of household members is within
the right of privacy which has been recognized by the courts." 178
Although the plaintiffs in Yeager chose to base their claim on
a protected right to privacy, they also sought to protect an
economic interest. If they had refused to comply with the disclo-
sure ordered by the water company, they would have been
subject to criminal or civil sanctions. Under economic substantive
due process doctrine, they could have challenged this potential
"deprivation" under the deprivations clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 7 9 The plaintiffs realized, however, that their only
hope for redress was assertion of their personal rights under
current substantive due process doctrine. They were compelled
to frame their attack within the confines of an individual-centered
doctrine, for the Supreme Court no longer recognized even the
tiniest vestiges of Lochner's expansive economic rights.
171. 615 F. Supp. at 1088. The court found that although the Hackensack Water
Company was not actually a government agency, its actions would be treated as state
actions because "[in certain' situations, where there is a close nexus between the state
and an action by a regulated entity, the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that
of the state itself." Id. at 1091 (citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
351 (1974)).
172. Id. at 1088.
173. Id. at 1089.
174. Id. The criminal penalties were principally fines provided for under N.J. STAT.
ANN. SS 58:1A-16 and App. A:9-49 (West 1982).
175. Id. at 1090. The statutory basis of the plaintiffs' appeal was the Privacy Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, S 7, 88 Stat. 1896, 1909 (printed at 5 U.S.C. S 552a (1988) (note)).
176. Id. at 1091.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1092.
179. Of course, any state action that could result in the imposition of criminal or civil
fines is potentially challengeable under the Fourteenth Amendment's Deprivations Clause;
Yeager is merely an example involving privacy analysis. See supra note 101 and accom-
panying text (describing the Deprivations Clause and its functions).
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Like Yeager, Andrews v. Ballard&i was susceptible to resolution
under a theory of economic rights. Andrews involved a challenge
to the Texas Medical Practice Act, which provided that only
licensed physicians could engage in the practice of acupuncture
in the State of Texas.18' The plaintiffs, who sought to have the
Medical Practice Act declared invalid, were not acupuncturists,
but rather patients who sought acupuncture treatment. They
claimed that the requirement that all acupuncturists be licensed
physicians violated their Fourteenth Amendment right of privacy,
because (1) their decision whether to receive medical treatment
was a private one and (2) the statute, although purporting to
protect public health, had the effect of nearly eliminating the
practice of acupuncture in the State of Texas. 2
The court agreed that the regulation of the practice of acu-
puncture violated the plaintiffs' privacy rights under the Four-
teenth Amendment.8 3 It compared the decision to receive
acupuncture treatment to the decision whether to continue or
terminate a pregnancy, and concluded that the decision to obtain
medical treatment is, "to an extraordinary degree, intrinsically
personal."'' 4 The court observed that "[t]he decision can either
produce or eliminate physical, psychological, and emotional ruin.
It can destroy one's economic stability. It is, for some, the
difference between a life of pain and a life of pleasure. It is, for
others, the difference between life and death." 185
So the state cannot interfere with such important personal
decisions even if the law in question purports to protect public
health and welfare. In another era, however, the plaintiffs in
Andrews might have chosen to base their claim on freedom of
contract, rather than on the right to privacy. Instead of relying
upon personal substantive due process, they could have chosen
economic substantive due process as the basis of their claim.
180. 498 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
181. Id. at 1039.
182. Id. The statute had this effect because Western medicine, practiced by most
licensed physicians in Texas, does not recognize the traditional Chinese medical and
philosophical theory underlying the practice of acupuncture. See id. at 1043. The Board
of Medical Examiners, in attempting to regulate the practice of acupuncture, called it an
"experimental procedure," worthy only of practice by experienced and licensed physicians.
Id. at 1041.
183. Id- at 1046-47.
184. Id. at 1047. The court distinguished the rights protected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) and Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), which may
involve "other individuals," from the right to undergo medical treatment, which involves
only the person seeking such treatment. Andrews. 498 F. Supp. at 1047.
185. Andrews, 498 F. Supp. at 1047.
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They could have argued that it was their right to contract for
the services of a practitioner of their own choosing, regardless
of whether the particular practitioner bore the state's stamp of
approval. 186 If the court had applied a Lochner-like approach, this
theory would have succeeded.
That a modern federal court might adopt an approach expressly
disavowed by the Supreme Court is extremely unlikely, however.
Any economic substantive due process claim would necessarily
fail, not because patients' rights are insubstantial, but merely
because the modern Court protects personal privacy rights but
does not protect economic rights. Indeed, the facts of Andrews
bear a remarkable similarity to those of Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co., 187 in which the Court upheld a statute prohibiting opticians
from fitting or duplicating eyeglasses without a prescription from
an ophthalmologist or an optometrist. In Williamson, as in
Andrews, a state prohibited a class of professionals from perform-
ing a particular medical service. In Williamson, however, the
Court dismissed the opticians' claim with the terse declaration
that "it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages" of regulatory laws.188 How could
the court have balanced those interests in Andrews if it lacked
the power to do so in Williamson?
The answer is that the federal judiciary does indeed possess
the power, authority, and capacity to define and protect economic
rights. Although it may lack "the practical power to' halt any
major social developments backed by insistent popular de-
mand," 189 this is no justification for treating economic rights
differently simply because they are economic. Indeed, courts
regularly protect and uphold "quite rarified" economic interests,
such as those dependent upon complex and ambiguous regulations
and statutes.'9 So although "doubts about judicial expertise and
power may warrant withdrawal from some economic questions,
186. Likewise, the practitioners could have asserted their right to engage in the
occupation of their own choosing, but they would not have been successful because in
such a case, the state's interest in protecting patients would be strong. An unqualified
practitioner could do a great deal of harm to multiple individuals in a given locality, but
a patient who is aware of the practitioner's qualifications and voluntarily seeks treatment
is in danger of harming only himself. Only suits brought by patients, not by practitioners,
would therefore be successful if courts adopted a Lochner-like approach to the question.
187. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
188. Id. at 487.
189. McCloskey, supra note 164, at 53.
190. Scalia, supra note 105, at 32.
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they cannot justify withdrawal from all such questions."191 Op-
pressive and arbitrary though it was, the doctrine of economic
substantive due process might have survived to the present day
(albeit in a diminished form) had historical accident'9 not led to
its utter destruction. If the doctrine had survived, it might now
serve a crucial function by permitting courts to protect banks
from the unjust operation of FIRREA's cross-guarantee.
THE CROSS-GUARANTEE AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS
A challenge to the cross-guarantee power would not involve
assertion of the right to freedom of contract, as did challenges
to the regulations in Lochner, West Coast Hotel, and Nebbia.193
Rather, the cross-guarantee constitutes a deprivation of property
in the term's most conventional sense: as Justice Chase would
say, money is being taken from one party and given to another.194
As previously discussed, a procedural due process challenge to
the cross-guarantee would probably fail because of the safeguards
provided by the Administrative Procedure Act. 95 Under the Fifth
Amendment, then, the best possible argument that can be made
against the cross-guarantee power involves substantive due proc-
ess.
Under West Coast Hotel and Williamson, which represent the
current approach to economic rights, interests such as those
banks hold in their assets deserve the lowest form of protection.
191. McCloskey, supra note 164, at 53.
192. As Nebbia shows, the Court began a slow retreat from the Lochner era well before
the great onslaught of New Deal legislation. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
Unfortunately, "[lthe tide of the welfare state was flowing, and no court could have
reversed it." McCloskey, supra note 164, at 53. Furthermore, in 1937 the Presidency
launched a vigorous (and ultimately unsuccessful) plan to bend the Court to its will by
"packing" it with six new Justices. See generally Louis FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1321-24 (1990) (tracing the history of the court-packing scheme). Whether these
pressures influenced the Justices' minds is impossible to know, but the fact remains that
the Court soon abandoned decades of precedent and reversed itself. Rather than slowly
deteriorating over many years, the doctrine of economic substantive due process was
shattered in a matter of months. See id. at 1324 & n.7 (noting that West Coast Hotel
essentially reversed a decision handed down just ten months earlier).
193. See supra notes 129-60 and accompanying text (explaining these three cases).
194. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Chase in Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798)). In a sense, the property is being taken for public
use because the FDIC is a government agency and its function is congressionally
authorized. As previously discussed, no sufficient "just compensation" for a taking of
cash assets, other than a repayment of those assets, appears to exist; but a repayment
would defeat the purpose of the provision altogether. See supra p. 313 and accompanying
text.
195. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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The government can regulate economic interests with impunity;
as long as the government accords the property owner due
process, it may take the owner's assets. Further, any "regulation
which is reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in
the interests of the community" is sufficient to satisfy the Fifth
Amendment's due process requirement.19
Modern economic substantive due process theory, if it exists,
does not provide any relief to a bank aggrieved by the cross-
guarantee provision. The "interest of the community" to which
the cross-guarantee bears a relation is the interest of the citizens
of the United States in maintaining a healthy and safe banking
industry, suitable to the needs of investors and depositors.
Whether the cross-guarantee is "reasonable in relation to its
subject" is a closer question; a bank would have to argue that
the seizure of funds from a related corporate entity is an unrea-
sonable approach to completing the FDIC's task as receiver of
the failed financial institution. Although this argument makes
sense to the disinterested layperson in view of the FDIC's alter-
natives,197 the current attitude among the judiciary regarding
economic rights makes it unlikely that any relief at all would be
afforded an aggrieved bank. Although it seems unfair that the
FDIC can make a unilateral decision to seize funds from an
institution in order to buttress its own finances, an institution
so assessed possesses no sound legal basis under modern Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence upon which to base its claim for re-
lief.19
Keeping in mind that the Supreme Court has not struck down
an economic regulation on the basis of substantive due process
since the Lochner era,199 examining the cross-guarantee under the
196. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
197. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (discussing alternative means of
funding, especially risk-based insurance premiums and the unpopular possibility of in-
creased taxation).
198. The most obviously unfair aspect of the cross-guarantee is the FDIC's ability to
use the power not only in cases of financial necessity (the cases for which the cross-
guarantee was apparently meant), but in cases where it is merely convenient for the
FDIC to use the power to achieve some other purpose. The exercise of the power in the
Bank of New England case was not one of financial necessity, but rather one of admin-
istrative convenience. FDIC Chairman Seidman has freely acknowledged that the exercise
of the power in that case was meant to render the Maine National Bank insolvent so
that the FDIC could more efficiently handle the Connecticut Bank and Trust insolvency.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
199. A good example of the Court's consistent refusal to recognize economic substantive
due process is the case of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978), in
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doctrine of economic substantive due process (both as accepted
in the early part of this century and as currently rejected) to
illustrate the provision's unfairness in operation may nevertheless
be useful.
The only action required of the FDIC before assessing a com-
monly controlled depository institution is the service of written
notice on the bank to be assessed.2°° The FDIC need not show
that the exercise is necessary; in fact, in the Bank of New England
case, the FDIC exercised the cross-guarantee because it was
convenient, not because it was financially necessary.2 1 The sei-
zure of assets in this way is analogous to a pre-judicial garnish-
ment in a civil case, because a hearing and the opportunity to
appeal is available to the aggrieved bank, but only after the
FDIC has ordered the payment. In Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.,20 2 a private action on a promissory note not involving a
government agency,203 the plaintiff challenged a pre-judicial gar-
nishment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides that any citizen
who denies another citizen "any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws" may be liable in a civil
action.2  Noting that the enjoyment of property rights was one
of the primary concerns of the Framers of the Constitution,
20 5
which the Court upheld a Maryland law enacted during the gas shortage crisis of the
early 1970's that prohibited producers or refiners from operating service stations within
the state borders. The Court dismissed the appellants' substantive due process argument
summarily, holding that the argument
requires little discussion. The evidence presented by the refiners may cast
some doubt on the wisdom of the statute, but it is, by now, absolutely clear
that the Due Process Clause does not empower the judiciary "to sit as a
'superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation' ....." Regardless of the
ultimate economic efficacy of the statute, we have no hesitancy in concluding
that it bears a reasonable relation to the State's legitimate purpose in
controlling the gasoline retail market.
Id. at 124-25 (citations omitted). The Court's unambiguous rejection of the claim leaves
little room for argument.
200. 12 U.S.C.S. S 1815(eX1)B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
201. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (quoting FDIC Chairman Seidman
regarding the exercise of the cross-guarantee). Unfortunately, the FDIC's first exercise
of the power was not prompted by financial necessity. Instead the FDIC undermined the
policy behind the power in its initial use, calling upon the cross-guarantee to resolve
administrative tangles rather than to meet a financial emergency.
202. 405 U.S. 538 (1972). Lynch was a procedural due process case (as opposed to a
substantive due process case), but its language is relevant to the cross-guarantee because
of the important status it accords property rights.
203. That neither the state nor federal government was involved in the Lynch case is
important because of the difference governmental involvement makes in the Supreme
Court's approach to such claims.
204. Lynch, 405 U.S. at 540 n.3. Significantly, the statute that was the basis of Mrs.
Lynch's action applies only to individuals, not to governmental agencies or actors.
205. I. at 544.
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the Court expressly rejected the appellees' arguments that the
Fourteenth Amendment and the federal statute in question pro-
tected only personal liberties and not economic rights. Economic
rights therefore enjoy a protection in private civil matters at
least equal to that of personal liberties; "the Congress that
enacted the predecessor of [the statute in question] seems clearly
to have intended to provide a federal judicial forum for the
redress of wrongful deprivations of property by persons acting
under color of state law."'
The approach of the Lynch case is an example of the fair
application of the Du6 Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. If the rationale of the case were extended both to the
Fifth Amendment and to government actions like the exercise of
the cross-guarantee, a fairer result would be obtained than under
the alternatives currently available to aggrieved banks. Rather
than making the cross-guarantee unavailable to the FDIC, a Lynch
approach would require some sort of process before the assets
could be seized.2°5 Even if the process were minimal, it would
discourage the use of the cross-guarantee for the convenience of
the FDIC, as in the Bank of New England case. The statute
would be used for the narrow purpose for which it was intended,
and achieve the results it was meant to achieve.2 9
A court applying substantive due process doctrine to the cross-
guarantee provision might, for example, require that bank re-
gulators make a prima facie showing of financial necessity before
exercising their power. Such a requirement would apply Nebbia's
test to ensure that the methods used to resolve the banking
crisis are not "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious. '210 Evalua-
206. Id. at 542.
207. Id, at 543.
208. As previously discussed, no process currently protects against an unjustified
seizure of assets; the FDIC must merely inform the bank in writing that it plans to
exercise the cross-guarantee. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
209. The Supreme Court permits postdeprivation remedies to satisfy the requirement
of due process if the action leading to the deprivation is random and unauthorized, if the
deprivation could not have been foreseen and prevented, if a predeprivation remedy
would be unfeasible, or if the state requires quick action. Zinermon v. Burch, 110 S. Ct.
975, 984-86 (1990). In a challenge to the cross-guarantee, the FDIC would most likely
argue that the provision is justified by a need for "quick action," as one of the FDIC's
primary aims is the provision of uninterrupted bank services to customers. Many bank
takeovers and purchase and assumption actions occur overnight for this very reason. If
the FDIC needs to provide written notice of its intent to exercise the cross-guarantee,
that written notice could, with a minimal additional burden, establish a prima facie case
of financial necessity. This notice requirement would bring the cross-guarantee action
within the range of actions for which a postdeprivation remedy is permissible.
210. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); see supra notes 142-50 and accompany-
ing text.
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tion of these claims would be well within the accepted powers
and capacities of the judiciary, and might even withstand appel-
late review so long as the court imposing the requirement avoided
labeling it "substantive due process."
In the alternative, some scholars have suggested that the way
around regulations that infringe on private property rights for
the benefit of the public is a simple "less-restrictive alternative"
test.21' "The principle is this: an economic regulation violates due
process if the government has a less restrictive alternative-
that is, if the government can achieve the purposes of the
challenged regulation equally effectively by one or more narrower
regulations."21 2 If raising money for the savings insurance fund
is the purpose of the cross-guarantee power, several less restric-
tive alternatives exist. Among these options are risk-based in-
surance premiums, which assess individual financial institutions
on a sliding scale according to the risk that they pose to their
depositors. Another alternative is the slow elimination of poorly
managed banks from the market by increased disclosure to the
public of bank investments and management policies. Finally, the
alternative of increased taxation, directed not at consumers but
at bank corporations, could fatten the savings insurance fund
enough to guard against depletion. A court applying the less-
restrictive alternative test would strike down the cross-guarantee
if it determined that one of these other alternatives could accom-
plish Congress' goal with equal effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
This Note shows that the doctrine of economic substantive due
process, although not currently used to invalidate economic re-
gulations, provides some useful insight into the workings and the
fairness of FIRREA's cross-guarantee provision. This Note does
not suggest an outright revival of the doctrine;213 such an exhu-
mation could seriously threaten much of the social legislation
that keeps our society intact. Nevertheless, if a government
agency possesses unrestricted power to seize assets from a bank
merely because of its relation to an insolvent financial institution,
211. See, e.g., Struve, supra note 111.
212. Id. at 1463.
213. No one would argue seriously that the era of Dred Scott, Lochner, and hour and
wage regulations directed specifically toward women should be brought back to life in
the 1990's.
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with no process other than written notice, the possibility exists
that the government may abuse its power. As illustrated by the
Bank of New England scenario, the power can be used in ways
for which it was not (at least not officially) intended.
More respect for the rights of sibling institutions is necessary,
even if the only adjustment in FIRREA is a requirement of a
prima facie showing of financial necessity along with written
notice to the assessed bank. Justice Chase's ideas about property
rights214 may be outdated in many respects, but they serve as a
useful reminder of the legislature's duties and responsibilities
toward property rights, even in our modern regulated banking
industry. The history of economic substantive due process shows
that courts have the capacity and expertise to protect these
rights.
Jennifer B. Arlin
214. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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